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ABSTRACT 
We combine new IT offshoring and IT workforce micro-data to investigate how the use of IT 
offshore captive centers is affecting the skill composition of the US onshore IT workforce. The 
analysis is based on the theory that occupations involving tasks that are “tradable”, such as 
tasks that require little personal communication or hands-on interaction with US-based objects, 
are vulnerable to being moved offshore. Consistent with this theory, we find that firms that 
have offshore IT captive centers have 8% less of their onshore IT workforce involved in 
tradable occupations; those without offshore captive centers have increased the proportion of 
onshore employment in these same occupations by 3%. In addition, we find that hourly IT 
workers (e.g., IT contractors) are disproportionately employed in tradable jobs, and their 
onshore employment is 2-3% lower in firms with offshore captive centers. These findings 
persist after considering different measures of employment composition, including controls for 
human capital, firm performance, domestic outsourcing, and whether firms choose to build or 
buy software.  Instrumental variables and corroborating regressions suggest that our estimates 
are conservative -- the magnitude of the effect generally rises after accounting for reverse 
causality and measurement error.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The impact of globalization on IT labor markets continues to be an active area of interest for 
academic researchers.  In this paper, we study how offshore IT employment is affecting the occupational 
and task composition of the US onshore information technology (IT) workforce.  We focus on IT workers 
because IT has been reported to be among the most widely offshored business functions in recent surveys 
(Lewin and Couto, 2007, Tambe and Hitt 2010), IT workers play a significant role in the growth of 
modern economies, and employment patterns observed in IT workers may be applicable in the future to 
other occupations. 
To organize and frame our analysis, we rely heavily on a theoretical literature that argues that 
“tradable” jobs – those that involve routine tasks that can easily be delivered through computer networks -
- are highly vulnerable to offshoring (Apte and Mason 1995, Jensen and Kletzer 2005, Mithas and 
Whitaker 2007, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008, Blinder 2009).  In contrast, tasks that require 
complex, “high-touch” (e.g., auto mechanics) or “personally” delivered services (e.g., retail sales) face 
less offshore competition because the delivery of these services is substantially degraded when provided 
over computer networks.  Our study relies on the observation that while IT jobs tend to be more tradable 
than other jobs, there is considerable variation even within the IT workforce in task composition.  Using 
this variation, we empirically link offshoring with a shift towards an onshore IT workforce that performs 
fewer tradable tasks and correspondingly more interactive or hands-on tasks.  Our data covers the period 
from 1995 to 2006, which includes a period of rapid growth in IT offshoring. 
A principal contribution of the paper is that we introduce new data sources through which we 
develop firm-level measures of 1) IT offshoring and 2) changes in onshore IT occupational and task mix.  
Our offshoring data is based on a random sample of 64,000 offshore IT workers with detailed profiles on 
a global employment networking site.  These workers represent about 7,500 US firms.  Our data captures 
employment in captive offshore centers, consistent with much of the existing literature on offshoring 
(Brainard and Riker 1997, Harrison et al. 2007, Desai et al. 2005).  Our focus is on offshoring to India 
since prior research suggests India is the most common location for cost-based offshoring, and cost-based 
offshoring may have the greatest implications for the US domestic IT workforce.  We combine offshoring 
data with detailed occupational data on 500,000 US IT workers from a different source that can be linked 
to their employers1 to construct firm level measures of occupational mix, human capital and other 
characteristics of their employer’s US workforce.  We are therefore able to link offshoring activity to the 
specific task demand represented by occupations. To the best of our knowledge, no prior work has linked 
                                                
1 It is generally difficult to link human capital data on individual employees to employers.  Prior work has used surveys, which 
are limited to a single point in time and may be inaccurate for characterizing large firms, or census data such as the Longitudinal 
Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) data, which are a rich resource that include human capital variables (Abowd et al. 2004) 
but do not include occupation and are difficult to obtain with firm identifiers, both of which are critical to our study. 
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offshoring to US employment mix using firm-level data because there are no US data sources on IT 
services imports2 at the firm level and little data describes firm-level changes in workforce composition. 
Rather than absolute employment changes, we consider changes in the skill composition of the IT 
workforce because our primary interest is in how optimizing firms adjust the skill-content of the domestic 
production of IT services in response to offshore IT labor.  The most common way to test for whether 
technological change such as offshoring favors some skills relative to others (i.e., is “skill-biased”) has 
been to examine the sign and significance of right hand side factors in a regression that uses the cost share 
of specific skills as the dependent variable. This approach has the added empirical benefit that it avoids 
confounding overall changes in IT labor demand with the offshoring decision.  Our study is broadly 
consistent with recent efforts to classify different occupations by vulnerability to offshoring in order to 
estimate how much of the US workforce might be vulnerable to offshoring (Blinder 2009). Researchers 
have applied these classifications to industry-level data.  For instance, Crino uses occupational 
employment and services imports data at the industry level to estimate labor-demand elasticities with 
respect to services offshoring for 100 white-collar occupations, including many IT jobs (Crino 2010).  
We contribute to this literature by examining how IT offshoring affects IT labor composition, at 
the firm rather than the industry level. Rather than examine aggregate services trade, which has been 
steadily rising over time, we focus specifically on the IT offshoring phenomenon which increased rapidly 
over a relatively short time period in the late 1990s. Furthermore, industry level data can conceal 
significant variation in the production choices of individual firms within an industry.  For example, an 
industry-level analysis cannot distinguish whether industry effects reflect the experience of a “typical” 
firm within the industry, or alternatively, combine changes in a few early adopters with minimal effects or 
countervailing effects in other firms in the industry that do no IT offshoring.3  Given that offshoring 
practices are still diffusing among firms, the latter is more likely to characterize the existing data, and 
distinguishing these alternatives has important implications for measuring the long term effects of 
offshoring on IT labor composition—in particular, if average industry effects are driven by a relatively 
small number of firms within the industry, this may imply a larger long-run effect as an increasing 
number of firms offshore IT work. Furthermore, an industry-level analysis may understate the effects of 
offshoring on skill composition to the extent that displaced IT workers move from offshoring firms to 
non-offshoring firms within the same industry, or to the extent that offshoring at the industry level is 
                                                
2 For example, a report issued by the Government Accountability Office in 2004 was entitled “Current Government Data Provide 
Limited Insight Into Offshoring of Services” (Government Accountability Office, 2004).  Even in the manufacturing sector, 
where there is an extensive body of literature linking cross-border trade and jobs, most data on occupations is aggregated to the 
industry level.  Thus, even if services data was comparable to manufacturing, we would still not capture all the shifts due to 
offshoring if displaced workers primarily move within the same industry. 
3 An industry analysis using our data shows somewhat smaller effects occurring later in the sample period than a firm level 
analysis. 
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confounded with industry-level differences in labor composition.  A firm-level analysis can also control 
for other firm-level determinants of labor composition, such as firm size, and provides greater flexibility 
when dealing with issues related to simultaneity between offshoring and workforce composition. 
Our analysis suggests that in firms that operate a captive center in India, the percentage of 
onshore IT workers performing tradable tasks fell by 8 points as a proportion of all onshore IT workers, 
while the percentage of workers performing these tasks in firms that do not operate captive centers has 
increased by 3 points over our time period.  These results are robust to a variety of controls for differences 
across firms, reverse causality and measurement error.  Moreover, the contrasting direction of the 
offshoring vs. non-offshoring firms in our sample suggests we are not confounding the effects of 
offshoring with overall changes in skill demand.  Also consistent with our “task trading” hypotheses, we 
find that the employment of hourly IT workers, who are disproportionately employed in the provision of 
tradable tasks,  is 2-3% lower in absolute terms in offshoring firms, a reduction of about one-sixth of all 
hourly IT employment in these firms. Therefore, our results suggest that: 1) firms that offshore IT 
services are readjusting their US-based IT workforces towards occupations requiring greater personal 
interaction and 2) that hourly IT workers are disproportionately affected. 
Our paper contributes to a literature on factors that influence the demand for IT skills (Lee et al. 
1995, Ang et al. 2002, Mithas and Krishnan 2008, Levina and Xin 2008) and an emerging literature on 
how globalization affects IT labor markets (Aspray et al. 2004).  These issues have direct implications for 
educational policies regarding IT workers and human capital management practices for the acquisition 
and retention of IT skills. 
2.  Framework 
The IT literature has emphasized the increasing importance of business and interpersonal skills 
relative to technical skills (Leitheiser 1992, Lee et al. 1995), a shift that has been occurring due to 
emphasis on activities such as process reengineering and integration, and because the increasing 
decentralization of the IT function required an IT workforce that could work within business units. Rapid 
changes in the supply and demand for IT labor during the dot-com boom and bust motivated a number of 
studies focused on the human capital and institutional factors affecting IT labor demand and IT wages 
(Ang, Slaughter, and Ng 2002, Mithas and Krishnan 2008, Levina and Xin 2008).  A recent literature has 
observed that the globalization of IT labor is becoming increasingly important for management of the IT 
workforce (Aspray et al. 2004). Researchers have examined issues related to the development of a global 
IT workforce (Bapna et al 2010) and its effect on the IT function within the firm (Lewin and Couto 2007, 
Tambe and Hitt 2010), but how managers balance skills across onshore and offshore IT workers remains 
an open question. 
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Our analysis of the impact of offshoring on onshore skill composition draws heavily on a 
theoretical literature linking offshoring to skill demand according to whether task output can be shipped 
over electronic networks (Apte and Mason 1995, Bardhan and Kroll 2003, Jensen and Kletzer 2007, 
Blinder 2009). Blinder’s classification uses personal interaction as the key evaluation criteria in 
developing a taxonomy of vulnerability to offshoring (shown in Figure 1), and at the task level, he 
classifies non-tradable tasks (personal tasks) as those that: 1) require extensive interpersonal 
communication with customers or other workers located in the US or 2) require interaction with a US-
based object.  He rank orders major US occupations according to their relative tradability along these 
criteria (Blinder 2009).  
Offshoring should affect IT labor markets along similar task-based lines.  For instance, many IT 
tasks such as computer programming can be performed remotely – customers can coordinate with 
programmers remotely, and computers can be located anywhere in the world.  By contrast, project 
managers or sales people can be difficult to offshore due to the importance of face-to-face contact in those 
jobs. Other workers, such as network administrators, frequently perform hands-on work with machines 
and physical networks, and therefore, also cannot be easily located offshore. This distinction does not 
imply that tradable tasks do not require interpersonal skills since most software production is done in 
teams and developers must regularly interact with their clients (Gopal et al. 2002).  However, even team-
based jobs are potentially offshorable because an entire team, or group of tasks, can be moved offshore. 
Thus, within the IT workforce, programmers and systems analysts are more easily tradable, while IT sales 
personnel, managers, and network administrators are less tradable.  
Although the theoretical guidance is consistent on this point, the extent to which IT offshoring 
has affected onshore skill-composition remains an empirical question. Classifications can shed light on 
the propensity of different skills to be offshored in the long-run, but only a subset of jobs that can be 
offshored has been offshored to date.  Furthermore, if tradable and non-tradable IT tasks are complements 
in the production of IT services, an increase in the global supply of IT workers capable of performing 
tradable tasks may also raise onshore demand for workers who can perform non-tradable tasks, which will 
also affect the composition of onshore skills.  Thus, the implications for the relative complementarities 
(non-substitutability) among various task groupings suggests that offshoring favors non-tradable skills 
onshore but the extent of these changes, which should first become visible at the firm level, is unknown. 
Therefore, a primary goal of this study is to measure how much IT offshoring shifts domestic skill-
composition in firms. The underlying hypothesis that is tested is: 
H1: Offshoring reduces the employment share of tradable tasks for onshore IT workers. 
This type of skill-based shift may affect some segments of the IT workforce more than others due 
to differing employment relationships.  In particular, contract workers, whose employment relationships 
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can be rapidly altered to changing supply and demand conditions (Slaughter and Ang 1996; Abraham and 
Taylor 1996), represent an unusually large4 and important part of the overall IT workforce (Gurbaxani 
1996, Ang and Straub 1998, Matusik and Hill 1998, Willcocks and Lacity 1998, Slaughter and Ang 2001, 
Barley and Kunda 2004).  Under a simple adjustment costs story, any effects experienced by the IT 
workforce due to offshoring are likely to be most pronounced for contract workers because these workers 
do not have long-term employment relationships and the cost to the firm of adjusting employment levels 
of contractors is likely to be small.   
In addition to an adjustment cost explanation, contract workers may also be differentially affected 
by outsourcing because they occupy different roles. Slaughter and Ang, in a series of case studies, find 
that while contractors mostly do computer programming, the tasks required by permanent employees 
range widely and include user interaction, implementation, system integration, vendor management, 
project management, and managing contract professionals (Slaughter and Ang 2001).  Similarly, Bidwell 
finds that managers tend to use IT contractors more for the technical aspects of work and less for tasks 
requiring user interaction (Bidwell 2009). Thus, permanent IT employees are more likely to be involved 
with personal tasks than IT contractors.  Furthermore, these studies also provide further support for an 
adjustment costs story by showing that the lower dismissal costs for IT contractors mean that changes in 
task requirements may more quickly manifest in changes in the demand for specific skills of contractors.  
We hypothesize that offshore hiring will shift the IT workforce towards permanent IT employees, because 
permanent IT employees are more likely be employed in jobs requiring cross-functional business 
knowledge and greater face-to-face interaction with customers and vendors. 
One limitation of our data is that IT contractors are not explicitly identified.   However, a notable 
distinction between IT contractors and permanent IT employees is that permanent IT professionals are 
most often salaried, while highly skilled IT contractors tend to be paid hourly rates.  Slaughter and Ang 
find evidence for this empirical regularity across a variety of different domains (Slaughter and Ang 2001).  
Hourly employment can also be common for customer support workers (e.g. helpdesk, technical support, 
installation technicians), who are often hired by firms on a contingent basis.  Therefore, in some of our 
specifications, we restrict our analyses to certain classes of workers to eliminate this heterogeneity.  In our 
regression analyses, we empirically distinguish IT contractors from permanent IT employees using hourly 
vs. salaried wage data for high-skill IT occupations, subject to the assumption that hourly wages in the IT 
sector are more closely associated with contract or contingent work and flexible employment.   We test 
the following hypothesis.  
H2: Offshoring reduces the employment share of hourly workers in the IT workforce. 
                                                
4 Estimates place the proportion of IT workers operating on short term contracts from 10-30% in large corporations (Slaughter 
and Ang 2001) 
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3. Data and Measures 
3.1 IT Offshoring Variables 
Our IT offshoring measures are created from data obtained in late 2006 from a leading online 
professional networking web site through which millions of individuals posted employment information, 
including occupation, primary industry affiliation, geographic location, professional positions, employer 
name, job title, years spent at the firm, and, for public companies, a ticker symbol.  This data set is useful 
for studying offshore IT employment because it is global in scope and popular among IT workers.  We 
obtained a random sample of about one million workers from this website.  These data include 
information on about 156,000 IT workers employed at about 7,500 US public firms.  Of these IT workers, 
about 92,000 are located in the US and 64,000 are located overseas.  The self-reported employment of 
these workers reflects the global IT employment of US firms.  While these data contain some potential 
error due to non-reporting, they may be more accurate than data generated by surveys since it is possible 
that managers may be unable or unwilling to provide accurate measures of offshore employment to 
interviewers. 
Using the location of overseas workers, we are able to control for the fact that firms offshore to 
different locations for different reasons, and these reasons may have direct implications for how 
offshoring affects the domestic workforce.  Prior work has shown that offshoring to high-cost locations 
may increase domestic employment, while offshoring to low cost locations decreases domestic 
employment (Harrison et al. 2007).  We therefore avoid this potential confound by restricting our sample 
to India, where offshoring is most often for cost reduction and skill acquisition (Lewin and Couto 2007, 
Tambe and Hitt 2010).  In our robustness analyses, however, we also test offshoring measures computed 
using offshore IT workers in other destinations. 
To create offshore IT employment measures from these data, we extracted individuals who list 
computer services or IT as their primary industry5, are located in India, and are employed by publicly 
traded firms with their headquarters located in the US.  There are about 2,500 such workers in our sample.  
From our sample data, we calculate that Indian IT workers are about 3.9% of the global IT workforce 
outside the US.  This is consistent with other estimates that suggest Indian IT employment is about 4-5% 
of the non-US IT workforce (Gokarn et al 2007;  IDC 2007) at the end of our sample period. 
We create two different offshoring measures.  The first is a binary offshoring variable which 
takes the value 1 if a firm has at least one IT worker employed in India, and indicates that a firm has 
established a captive center.  Second, we create a variable indicating the percentage of the firm’s total IT 
workforce located in India (Head and Ries 2002 use a similar measure of offshore employment).  This 
                                                
5 Specifically individuals who identify “Information Technology and Services,” “Computer Software,” “Internet,” “Computer 
Networking,” “Computer and Network Security,” “Computer Hardware,” “Telecommunications,” or “Semiconductors” as their 
primary job affiliation. 
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measure captures differences in IT offshoring intensity (IT workers in India/Total IT workers) among 
firms that are offshoring but may be more subject to measurement error that is filtered out by the binary 
variable, such as differences in participation rates on the website that provided our data across a firm’s 
Indian establishments. Therefore, we use both measures in our analysis. We conducted a number of 
comparisons to ensure that our offshoring measures track well against other available offshoring data—
they are similar in both overall incidence as well as cross-industry distribution.6 
One concern about using captive centers (i.e., multi-national overseas employment) as a measure 
of offshoring, despite the prevalence of this measure in the literature (Brainerd and Riker 1997; Desai, 
Foley, and Hines 2005, Harrison, Mcmillan, and Null 2007), is that we may understate offshore activity 
by not including third-party offshore outsourcing. Prior research suggests that captive centers comprise 
slightly less than half of all offshoring activity, and that firms with captive offshore IT centers are likely 
to engage in third-party offshore outsourcing or hybrid captive-outsourced offshoring approaches (Lewin 
and Couto 2007, Rajeevan et al. 2007).   There are three reasons why we believe that our analysis reflects 
overall offshoring activity.  First, most of the effect we observe is located in the early part of our sample 
when captive centers were common, but offshore outsourcing was less prevalent.  We are therefore 
capturing offshoring as it appeared at the time.  Second, surveys suggest a substantial fraction of firms use 
either captive centers or both captive centers and offshore outsourcing so the two types of offshoring are 
highly correlated (Tambe and Hitt, 2010).7  Third, we can address this concern econometrically by noting 
that omitting offshore outsourcing will lead us to underestimate the extent of offshoring, making our 
results conservative under the reasonable assumption that the domestic employment effects of all types of 
offshoring are similar.  Instrumental variables and first difference estimates are less subject to this form of 
measurement error, and we can also repeat this analysis for industry subsamples where we believe this 
bias is small. Overall, we find little evidence that the omission of offshore outsourcing has substantially 
affected our estimates or conclusions. 
3.2 Onshore IT Skills Measure 
We measure onshore IT skills using micro-data describing the employment histories of a very 
large sample of US IT workers from a leading careers site.  For each employee in the data set, the 
employer name, employment dates, job title, and occupation are included. We also have human capital 
variables for each worker, including education and experience. From these data, we extracted the 
approximately 500,000 IT workers (about 10-15% of the entire US-based IT workforce) who appeared in 
the data set between 1995 and 2006.  Because these data indicate who is employed at each firm in a given 
year, we can measure the occupational distribution of a firm’s IT workforce by aggregating employees’ 
                                                
6 See Appendix A in a longer version of this paper (Tambe and Hitt 2011b). 
7 It is worth noting that firms switching from captive center to hybrid or third party models will produce positive correlations in 
levels, but negative correlations in differences as firms substitute captive centers with other organizational forms. 
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jobs classifications to the firm level for each year. The workers that appear in the data set also indicate if 
they were full-time or hourly workers in 2006, whether they have a security clearance, and level of 
educational attainment, which allows us to calculate aggregate firm-level averages of these measures for 
each firm-year in our dataset.  In other work, we benchmark these IT employment data, and we show that 
they compare favorably to external data sets with regards to human capital and cross-firm distributions 
(Tambe and Hitt 2011a). 
To classify occupations by tradability, we apply the method proposed by Blinder (2009). To the 
best of our knowledge, only two studies have developed frameworks for ranking jobs by tradability at a 
detailed occupation level Blinder (2009) and Jensen and Kletzer (2007).  We use Blinder’s classification 
because it has been widely employed in other studies of globalization and employment structure (Becker 
et al. 2009, Crino 2010).  Although there are some differences between the Blinder and Jensen and 
Kletzer classifications generally, they are similar within the IT sector.  Thus, our classification approach 
is consistent with essentially all the comparable literature on globalization and jobs. 
Blinder rank orders jobs on a scale from 1 to 100, using task level detail from the Department of 
Labor’s O-NET database, which describes the task content of over 950 occupational classifications. A 
higher score, closer to 100, indicates that a job consists mostly of tradable tasks and is therefore easily 
offshored, while a score closer to 0 indicates that a job is unlikely to be offshored.  The tradability of the 
tasks performed in a particular IT job is quantified by matching job titles to occupational codes in the 
O*Net database8 both by hand9 and using specialized software, and then assigning workers to the 
appropriate index value. 
Our main dependent variable is IT workforce skill composition--the fraction of IT workers in 
tradable jobs out of all IT workers at a firm.  We use a composition measure for two reasons.  Theory and 
prior empirical research in offshoring generally suggests a relationship between employment share and 
offshoring – usually a ratio of employment or wages to total costs, variable costs, total employment, or 
occupational employment – rather than absolute changes in occupational employment.  Composition 
measures are also less likely to be affected by external factors such as changes in the demand for IT labor 
generally or shifts in the size of individual firms.  Finally, a balanced treatment of offshoring and 
employment levels would require determining the effect of offshoring on non-IT employment as well, 
which is beyond the scope of our analysis.  Our study is limited, therefore, in the sense we cannot make 
assessments of how offshoring affects the absolute demand for specific IT skills. 
The fraction of IT workers in a firm who provide tradable task inputs (tradable task intensity) is 
computed as the percentage of IT workers employed in jobs exceeding a threshold in Blinder’s index. His 
                                                
8 http://online.onetcenter.org 
9 We also conducted this matching process using automated software, but we found no significant differences.  Results produced 
when using the automated method are shown in our robustness tests. 
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ranking values are ordinal, so the choice of a particular threshold is subjective. One threshold to consider 
is 75, which is the boundary marking the Category I jobs that Blinder describes as “highly offshorable” in 
the long run.  In most of our analysis, however, we instead use a higher threshold of 92 because this is the 
line at which much of the short-run shift in task share during the years in our panel appears to be 
occurring.  As we show in our analysis, choosing a lower value does not significantly change our results, 
but reduces the precision at which we can interpret our estimates.  Applying this measure to our panel 
data on IT employment allows us to calculate the fraction of IT workers at a firm that are tradable for 
each firm in each year. 
3.3 Other Data and Measures 
We use Compustat data for standard firm-level measures such as industry and total employment.  
In addition, we obtained data from a recent survey (2008) of approximately 200 senior IT officers (e.g. 
CIO, CTO, or Vice President) that included questions on the fraction of firm-wide information systems 
expenditure on (domestic) outsourcing and the extent to which the firm builds its own software or buys 
packaged software, which we will use for robustness tests.  All of the measures used in this study and 
their method of construction are summarized in Table 2. 
4. Empirical Implementation 
Our main regression models relating IT skill composition to offshoring activity are consistent 
with an established literature on outsourcing and skills.10 The logic of our model is that there is a tradeoff 
between lower wages from offshore employment and higher coordination costs (or production 
inefficiencies) arising from managing remote production.  Tradable tasks receive the same wage cost 
benefits, but have fewer coordination cost concerns, so the “price” a firm faces for offshore labor is lower 
for these tasks.  However, the option to use offshore labor only accrues to firms that have sunk the fixed 
cost needed to establish an offshore center. 
To formalize this observation, let production be characterized by a transcendental logarithmic 
cost function that relates total cost (C) to the prices and quantities of tradable IT labor onshore (Litt with 
price Pitt), tradable IT labor offshore (Lito, Pito), non-tradable IT labor (Litn, Pitn), ordinary capital and labor 
(K, L, Pk, Pl) and the level of output (V).   Firms that have made an investment in an offshore center (O, 
where O=1 if the firm has invested offshore, 0 otherwise) can procure tradable labor offshore, while other 
firms cannot.  Applying Shepard’s lemma to the cost function yields a factor demand equation for 
onshore labor: 
                                                
10 See e.g., Berman et al. 1994, Feenstra and Hanson 1996, Slaughter 2000, Strauss-Kahn 2004, Head and Reis 
2005, Hansson 2005, Crino 2009, Becker et al. 2008, Hakkala, 2009, Hijzen, Gorg, and Hine 2010, Hakkala and 
Huttunen 2010. 
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Using the standard assumption that firms face similar prices for factor inputs in any given year, we can 
collect all terms that only vary by time (t) into a single intercept and rewrite the outsourcing term: 
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Our focus will be on obtaining estimates of α , which should be negative since offshore and onshore 
tradable tasks are close substitutes.  For our empirical implementation, we estimate the time varying terms 
using a dummy variable for each year (see Machin and Van Reenen, 1998, Head and Ries, 2002) and 
make two additional approximations. First, although α theoretically should vary over time, the variation 
is likely to be small, especially in the presence of a time varying intercept, so we assume it is constant 
over time.  Second, variation in factors other than IT labor are likely to be small (offshore IT labor is on 
the order of 0.2% of total costs) and price effects on cost share conditional on time are also negligible, so 
we focus on the share of tradable tasks in total IT labor rather than cost shares.  We show that estimates 
without these assumptions are virtually identical, but we make these two simplifications to make the 
magnitudes more easily interpretable.  Similar employment-share estimates have informed other studies 
of offshoring (Anderton and Brenton 1999, Machin and Van Reenen 1998, Strauss-Kahn 2003, Hijzen, 
Gorg, & Hine 2005) and these studies have also found that using employment-share produced results 
similar to when using cost-share.  Our base estimating equation is thus: 
 logit t V it itTTSHARE V O controlsγ γ α ε= + + + +  (1)  
The dependent variable in (1), tradable task intensity (TTSHAREit) for each firm (i) in each year 
(t), is the share of tradable tasks in the firm’s IT workforce, O is our offshoring indicator, and V is a 
measure of firm output.  In addition, we include dummy variables for time (represented by tγ ) as well as 
additional firm controls such as industry (at the 2-digit SIC level), the logarithms of total employment 
(from Compustat) and IT employment (from our workforce data), and sales growth (PCTSALES, from 
Compustat).  The two size measures control for organizational differences between smaller and larger 
firms or IT departments, and sales growth captures potential differences between expanding or shrinking 
firms that may face different costs of adjusting their labor force.  We also control for firm-level 
characteristics of the IT workforce, including education, experience, and job tenure, averaged across all 
workers at the firm. 
Equation (1) can be estimated using OLS in levels with Huber-White robust standard errors 
(clustered by firm) or first differences, which removes all time invariant firm effects and is commonly 
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used in employment studies where there might be unobserved firm heterogeneity.  The same model is 
used to conduct our tests on the effect of offshoring on hourly workers, where tradable task share is 
replaced by hourly worker share in Equation (1). 
Endogeneity 
Our model includes controls for detailed characteristics of the IT workforce and difference 
estimates mitigate estimation bias due to differences among firms.  For instance, our difference estimates 
should have little bias because firms differ in their composition of tradable skills and those with more 
demand for these skills may be more likely to offshore due to the potential for scale economies in an 
offshore facility.  However, our firm controls will have more limited effect in mitigating bias due to time-
specific reverse causality.  For instance firms may anticipate a change in their need for specific IT tasks 
and invest in offshoring to reap additional benefits when this occurs.  As an initial check, we can test if 
historical workforce composition predicts offshoring adoption.  If differences in skill requirements are 
driving offshoring, then firms with a particular skill mix should have been among the first to adopt 
offshoring. We conducted several analyses that indicate that a firm’s skill composition in 1990, which 
predates most serious offshoring activity, was a relatively poor predictor of 2006 offshoring levels.11 
Our second (and primary) strategy for resolving the potential endogeneity issue is to supplement 
our cross-sectional and difference results with results from an instrumental variables (IV) estimator, 
where we treat offshoring as endogenous, and use instruments that capture factors that influence the 
ability to engage in offshoring across firms but are not related to skill requirements conditional on the 
other control variables. We report results from traditional IV estimators, as well as those that account for 
the binary nature of the potentially endogenous offshoring variable by using a probit model to estimate 
the first stage. 
The benefits and costs of offshoring may vary by firm in ways unrelated to IT task composition 
and we have two instruments that capture this variation. First, the number of non-IT offshore workers 
employed by the firm may reflect lower offshoring costs to the extent that firms can share fixed costs for 
an offshore center across more workers.  These data are available from the same source we use for our 
offshoring measure. Second, we use the fraction of IT workers with a security clearance.  Firms that 
perform secure work cannot shift this work offshore so firms that perform extensive secure work cannot 
as readily use offshoring. 
First stage regressions suggest that these variables along with the other control variables explain a 
significant amount of the decision to open a captive center, in contrast to the 1990 skill mix measure, 
which does little to explain the choice to open a captive center.  Therefore, we see no evidence in our 
preliminary (or subsequent) analyses that would suggest that the decision to offshore is subject to reverse 
                                                
11 The results of these analyses can be found in Appendix C in a longer version of this paper (Tambe and Hitt 2011b). 
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causality – that is, our data strongly suggest that firms that choose to offshore change their skill mix;  we 
do not find evidence that existing skill mix is a driver of offshoring. 
A residual concern with using firm-level instruments is that they may be determined 
endogenously along with the firm’s workforce structure.  Therefore, we report estimates from a second 
set of instruments that are external to the firm and but also affect offshoring propensity.  We use two 
variables to form this instrument set, 1) industry concentration and 2) offshoring by other firms in the 
industry.  Both variables measure competitive pressures from the firm’s environment to lower IT labor 
costs through offshoring.  The R2 in a first-stage regression using these instruments is comparable to the 
first-stage regression when using firm-level instruments.  In our analysis below, we test these instruments 
alone and in conjunction with our firm-level instruments. 
5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 3 shows statistics for the firms in our sample.  About 53% of IT workers in our sample are 
employed in the production of personal services.  We find a comparable number of 53% in the 2006 
Occupational Employment Survey by combining workers in “Computer and Mathematical Science 
Occupation” and IT management, although OES may undercount IT sales workers.  Between 18% and 
19% of the IT workers in the firms in our sample report being paid hourly wages in 2006. 
The average level of experience for IT workers in these firms is 13 years, with a duration of 5 
years for a typical employment spell and 3 years at the current employer.  Most workers have at least four 
years of college education.  Firms in our sample are also quite large, with about 19,000 employees and 5 
billion dollars in sales, on average. 
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we compare mean values of the main variables in our analysis, 
depending on whether or not the firms have offshore IT facilities.  Sales are significantly higher for 
offshoring firms, reflecting the scope and size differences of multinational firms.  Among workforce 
variables, the onshore IT workforce in offshoring firms performs significantly fewer tradable tasks and 
has higher education levels.  These differences are consistent with the theory of task tradability discussed 
earlier.  In Table 4, we report correlations between the firm-level variables.  Of particular interest are the 
correlations in Column 1, which suggest that offshoring is positively associated with IT workforce size, 
and negatively associated with the demand for tradable tasks in the onshore IT workforce. 
The graph in Figure 2 illustrates how the share of tradable IT tasks has been changing over time 
in offshoring and non-offshoring firms. Task content for these firms was similar in 1995 but begins to 
diverge thereafter.  The percentage of IT workers performing tradable tasks in non-offshoring firms rises 
slowly between 1995 and 2006, but drops by about 8 points in the same period in offshoring firms.  The 
fact that tradable task composition is similar among firms at the beginning of our sample also suggests 
that it does not explain the propensity to offshore (consistent with our causality arguments).  In Table 5, 
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we report the comparable statistics from 1995 and 2006. A t-test rejects the hypothesis that the mean 
difference between these two sets of firms is the same (t=7.61). The statistics in Tables 3 and 5 indicate 
that offshoring affects IT task mix in a direction consistent with theory, but in the next section, we more 
rigorously test how offshoring affects IT workforce composition. 
6. Regression Results 
6.1 Offshoring and IT Workforce Composition 
 The main results of the paper are in Table 6. The dependent variable in all regressions is the 
fraction of tradable tasks performed by the firm’s IT workforce. We start with an OLS regression using 
the pooled sample over all years with Huber-White robust standard errors (clustered by firm). The results 
in (1) indicate lower onshore levels of tradable tasks being performed by firms that have a captive IT 
center located in India (t=5.72, p<.001).  The coefficient magnitudes suggest that after controlling for 
other factors, the difference in the percentage of onshore tradable tasks being performed between 
offshoring and non-offshoring firms is about 8 points. In (2), we test one-year difference estimates, which 
remove the effects of time-invariant sources of heterogeneity that are associated with the offshoring 
indicator. The coefficients from the differences regression indicate that establishing a captive center is 
associated with about a one point per year drop in the percentage of tradable tasks onshore after 
controlling for other factors (t=2.17, p<.05). If firms in our sample established captive centers in the mid 
to late 1990’s, this 1 percentage point difference, compounded over the years in our time sample is 
roughly consistent with the 8 percentage point difference estimated in our cross-sectional results. 
In Column (3), we show results from IV regressions using non-IT offshore workers and security 
clearance as instruments for the IT offshoring decision.  The estimates from the IV regression are larger in 
magnitude than our original coefficient estimate on offshoring (t=2.01, p<.05).  The R-squared value for 
the first-stage regression is .19, and a Hausman test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
establishment of a captive center is exogenous with respect to onshore workforce mix. The higher IV 
estimate suggests that unobserved factors tend to bias our offshoring coefficients towards zero. Our use of 
an IV estimator when the endogenous variable is binary should produce estimates that are consistent, but 
have decreased statistical power relative to an estimator that predicts binary outcomes in the first stage.  
Therefore, in (4), we estimate a treatment effects model that estimates the endogenous binary offshoring 
variable during the first stage using a probit estimator. As expected, the result from the treatment effects 
model produces an estimate that is similar in magnitude to the estimate in (3), but with smaller standard 
errors (t=4.63, p<.01). 
6.2 Extensions 
In this section, we use various alternative measures of offshore and domestic IT workers to 
further develop our core result.  In Table 7, we present estimates using the percentage of IT workers in 
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captive centers rather than a binary variable indicating the establishment of a captive center, which is the 
variable we have analyzed thus far.  The offshoring coefficients in (1) are negative and significant 
(t=2.70).  The estimates from our differences model in (2) are also negative at the same levels of 
significance (t=2.26). In (3), we report estimates on the percentage of captive center IT workers, 
conditional on having a captive center.  The estimates indicate that a higher percentage of captive center 
IT workers is observed in firms with higher levels of tradable tasks in the onshore IT workforce.  This 
result suggests that the negative estimates in (1) confound the effects of the offshoring decision with a 
positive association between percent offshore and onshore tradable task composition.  This upward bias 
disappears after differencing, and the differenced estimate in (4) is similar to our earlier differenced 
estimates (t=1.9).   
The upward bias in our cross-sectional estimates suggests that 1) an IV estimator will have a 
larger impact on offshore intensity estimates than the offshoring binary variable because offshore 
intensity is subject to greater endogeneity concerns, and 2) that simultaneously including both the 
offshoring dummy and percent offshored in a regression should produce a larger negative estimate on the 
offshoring decision variable.  These are confirmed in (5) and (6).  Use of the IV estimator inflates the 
estimate and the standard error on offshore share, but the estimate is not significant.  The offshoring 
binary estimate in (5) confirms that offshoring intensity and the offshoring decision push in opposite 
directions, and separating the effects of these two variables slightly raises the magnitude of the estimate 
on the offshoring decision variable.  These results suggest that using an offshoring binary variable as a 
marker of offshoring activity produces a conservative estimate, and that in firms with high levels of 
onshore tradable tasks, incurring the fixed costs of an offshore captive center increases offshoring levels 
of all types.  Our interpretation of these results is that once a captive center has been established, 
offshoring rises with (unobservable) firm-specific demand for tradable tasks, but that this effect is 
dominated by workforce differences between firms with and without offshore centers.  This suggests that 
the demand for offshoring is likely to be higher for firms with greater demand for tradable tasks, which 
implies that firm-specific unobservable variables related to skill or task demand will tend to impose a 
conservative bias on our estimates. 
In Table 8, we analyze the relationship between offshoring and the percent of IT hourly 
employees hired by organizations.  The results in Column (1) show that offshoring firms hired 2-3% 
fewer hourly workers than non-offshoring firms in 2006 (t=1.8).  These results are restricted to 2006 
because workers in our sample identified themselves as hourly or annual salaried workers only in 2006.  
However, we can conduct a quasi-differences test if we assume that most workers retain the same work 
status over several years.  Departures from this assumption may introduce noise into our dependent 
variable, but not in a systematic way that could bias our results.  The offshoring coefficient from a 
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differenced specification using the years from 2000 to 2006 indicates an association between offshoring 
and workforce task mix that is consistent with our prior results, but the estimates are slightly short of 
significant.  Nevertheless, these results provide evidence that part of the workforce shift that we find 
evidence for in earlier sections may in part be due to a shift away from the use of IT workers who are paid 
hourly and are more likely to be performing tradable tasks. 
The results in (3) and (4) show that offshoring impacts the task content of work similarly if 
examining hourly and annual salaried workers separately. The number of observations in (3) and (4) are 
different than in (1) because some firms have only hourly or salaried IT workers that appear in our 
sample, so many firms in the full sample are not included when narrowing the focus to only hourly 
workers or only salaried workers.  In (5) and (6), we explore how offshoring affects task mix in the 
overall sample, but we use hourly worker percentage as a control variable to test if the observed changes 
in task content are explained by the shift away from hourly workers.  The results in (5) are the benchmark 
case that includes only the 2006 sample of firms. In Column (6), we also include the fraction of hourly 
workers employed by the firm into our model.  We find that firms with a higher fraction of hourly 
workers perform a higher fraction of tradable tasks, which is consistent with the distribution of tasks 
between hourly and salaried workers, and that conditional on the fraction of hourly workers employed by 
the firm, offshoring is still associated with a shift away from tradable tasks being performed onshore 
(t=3.29). 
Finally, in (7) we report results when restricting the IT workers in our sample to those classified 
as exempt by the Fair Labor Standards Act since it is normal for exempt employees to be salaried rather 
than paid hourly. Our use of the hourly wage classification as a proxy for contractor status may not be 
justified for IT support workers, who are often classified as non-exempt employees and are paid hourly 
wages.12  Furthermore, IT support workers are often offshored to provide 24-hour support.  We check, 
therefore, whether the associations between offshoring and hourly worker usage persist after excluding IT 
support workers and other workers who potentially fall into non-exempt categories, and for whom hourly 
wages may not reflect contractor status.  The estimates from (7) are computed by using only IT managers, 
programmers, and systems analysts, all of which are exempt occupations. Most notably, this list does not 
include computer support workers, who comprise a large fraction of the IT workers in our data set, but it 
also excludes other workers such as network administrators who are sometimes also considered non-
exempt.  However, the results shown in (7) are similar to those in (1), indicating that our results are 
probably not driven solely by the offshoring of support workers.  In other words, our results support not 
only that hourly workers are more likely to be affected by offshoring, but the stronger statement that these 
                                                
12 For a more thorough discussion of the categorization of IT workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act, see 
http://hrhero.com/hl/articles/2008/10/17/correctly-classifying-it-employees-as-exempt-or-non-exempt/?TOPIC. 
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effects may specifically apply to IT contractors.  These results suggest that offshoring affects hourly 
workers disproportionately because of the distribution of tasks between the two types of workers — shifts 
in employment distribution across these workers appear to primarily be related to differences in work task 
content, rather than other differences.   
In Table 9, we look at the effects of offshoring to different locations or offshoring technical vs. 
non-technical IT workers.  In addition to providing a more nuanced perspective on offshoring and skill 
composition, these tests address the criticism that our offshoring estimates may reflect unobserved 
attributes of large, global firms rather than the effects of skills-based offshoring—if this were the case, 
any observed effects would not be limited to the offshoring of technical workers or offshoring to specific 
locations.  In Column (1), we include the percentage of IT workers located in India, as well as a second 
measure computed from the percentage of IT workers located in countries other than India or the US. 
Including the second offshoring measure addresses some endogeneity concerns, because task trading in 
the IT sector appears to be occurring primarily when offshoring to India — offshoring to other locations 
is more likely to be associated with growth or expansion patterns (Tambe and Hitt 2010).  The estimates 
indicate that the observed workforce shifts are associated with offshoring to India rather than other 
destinations, and our offshoring coefficient is probably reflecting the task trading patterns that we are 
interested in, rather than unobserved factors that might cause firms to expand globally.  
In Column (2), we include offshore share measures computed from offshoring different types of 
IT workers, where workers are classified as technical, managerial, or other, depending on their two digit 
O-NET occupational codes. The results indicate that our task trading results are associated with the 
offshoring of technical workers, rather than workers of other types, which is consistent with the argument 
that the division of tasks across countries, rather than other unobserved workforce attributes of offshoring 
firms, are driving our results. The number of workers in each of these occupational categories is roughly 
the same, so our results are not driven by measurement error or sample size. The point estimate on the 
technical worker measure is larger than our initial estimated elasticity when using offshore share as an 
independent variable in Table 7, perhaps because for the task-level workforce changes of the kind that we 
are exploring, the offshoring of technical workers is the more accurate measure, rather than the offshoring 
of all IT workers including the management layer. 
6.3 Robustness Tests 
In Table 10, we present results from a number of additional regressions that test the robustness of 
our main results in Table 6.  In (1), we present results from a regression using instruments that are 
external to the firm: industry concentration measured as a Herfindahl index, and the mean of the 
offshoring variable for other firms in the same 2-digit industry. These instruments produce an estimate 
that is significant and broadly consistent with the IV results from regressions using our firm-level 
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instruments (t=2.39).  Including the full set of instruments from both the firm and the industry level in (2) 
produces similar results (t=3.66).  Our estimates in most cases indicate that any endogeneity in the 
offshoring variable is likely to bias our estimates in a conservative direction (downward toward zero).  
The results from a differences IV regression in (3) are not significant, perhaps because of the limited 
power of our firm-level instruments in differences.  However, the direction and magnitude of the estimate 
are consistent with our expectations. 
In Columns (4) and (5), we test the extent to which our results may be driven by IT services 
industries, using the IV specification with our firm-level instruments. IT services offshoring may be 
fundamentally different because captive centers often serve as offshore development centers that provide 
IT services to global clients.13  We test this assertion by narrowing our sample to SIC 73, which includes 
industries where IT workers are generally employed in production rather than support, and has some of 
the highest offshoring rates (Tambe and Hitt 2010).  Interestingly, the offshoring coefficient in (4) when 
restricting the sample to SIC 73 is no longer significant.  The regression in (5) includes firms in all other 
industries, and indicates that our earlier reported effects of offshoring are driven by IT-using industries, 
where IT workers are more likely to be support workers than production workers.  In IT services 
offshoring, where firms may need to employ both technical and client-facing personnel, a geographic 
division of labor within the firm’s workforce may not be as viable. 
In Column (6), we include measures of 1) overall IT outsourcing and 2) packaged software usage 
as control variables, both of which have experienced tremendous growth, and both of which are likely to 
have affected IT labor demand.  However, if offshoring firms have less need for outside IT contractors, as 
is suggested by the correlations in Table 4, then this will bias our offshoring coefficients downwards.  We 
test if our results are robust to including measures of outsourcing and packaged software by using data 
collected in a recent survey on the extent of IT outsourcing and whether firms build or buy the software 
they use, available for a subset of the firms in our sample.  The point estimate on the offshoring 
coefficient after including these variables is comparable to (1), and indicates that offshoring is associated 
with a significant drop in the percentage of onshore IT work composed of tradable tasks (t=1.80, p<0.1).  
The reduced significance is due to a smaller sample from limited availability of our supplemental survey 
measures, not because of bias due to omitting these variables as covariates.  In Column (7), we present 
differenced results after dropping data points in which firms open new offshore centers—identification, 
therefore, comes from onshore workforce shifts as firms exit captive centers.  Interestingly, our effect 
sizes are larger in this regression, suggesting that firms are faster to reorganize the onshore workforce 
when they close an offshore establishment. 
                                                
13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
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As discussed earlier, a potentially important variable omitted from our analysis is domestic 
outsourcing levels, so we also take a closer look at domestic outsourcing.  In column (6) of Table 10, we 
showed that our offshoring coefficients do not change substantially when controlling for domestic 
outsourcing levels, but we present additional results here.  Conditional on size, offshoring and domestic 
outsourcing should be negatively correlated if firms hire labor through either one or the other of these 
mechanisms.  However, we can explicitly test if workforce composition in industries that provide 
domestic outsourcing services is substantially different than that in other industries.  In particular, any 
observed workforce shifts may partially be accounted for by counter-shifts in the workforce composition 
of domestic outsourcing firms instead of a counter-shift in offshore firms, which has very different 
implications for the US labor market because it indicates a reallocation of tasks among US firms, rather 
than across countries.  However we cannot reject the hypothesis (see Table 11) that IT workforce 
composition in IT consulting industries (SIC 7370) is the same as that of other industries.  
For another perspective on the interrelationship between our offshoring results and domestic 
outsourcing we can use the observation that firms that do high security work cannot offshore but can 
domestically outsource work.  We can test whether our results are affected by domestic outsourcing, by 
looking for differences in tradable task composition between high-security and low-security firms.14 If 
domestic outsourcing is causing the skill composition shift we observe, there should be no difference 
between high-security and low-security firms.  However, we find that IT workforce differences between 
the two sets of firms (Table 11) are substantial. The differences indicate that the proportion of tradable 
tasks is higher in high-security firms.  Thus, whether or not a firm has the ability to offshore IT work is 
associated with differences in the task composition of onshore work (t=3.62, p<.01).  
In Table 12, we test the sensitivity of our results to our model assumptions. In (1), we test our 
assumption that price effects on cost share are likely to be negligible by using cost share rather than 
employment share as a dependent variable.  Because we have wage data for the workers in our sample in 
2006, we can construct the cost share of IT workers employed in impersonal tasks for that year. The 
correlation between the cost share and employment share variable in 2006 is .94 and using cost share 
produces an offshoring estimate that is very similar to when using employment share.  In (2), we test the 
assumption that time-varying effects, which we assume to be constant across firms and absorbed by year 
dummies, are actually the same between offshoring and non-offshoring firms by interacting the year 
dummies with the offshoring variable. A joint significance test of the hypothesis that the year dummy 
variables interacted with offshoring is significantly different than zero cannot be rejected (F(10, 
1430)=.95; Prob > F=.48). 
                                                
14The partial correlations between security clearance and outsourcing in our outsourcing data are not significantly different than zero, so it does 
not appear that of the firms in our sample, security clearance is associated with lower outsourcing levels (N=86).  Moreover, a positive correlation 
between the two suggests that high-security firms are, if anything, outsourcing larger amounts of work. 
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In (3)-(6), we test the sensitivity of our analysis to the methods used to map job titles to O-Net job 
codes. Our initial categorization of IT workers by job title into O-Net occupational categories was 
performed using third-party software that is explicitly designed for this purpose and is currently being 
used by state governments to map reported job titles to skills.  However, for robustness, we also 
performed similar tests after hand matching common job titles to O-Net codes.  The size of the sample 
created through this exercise was smaller than that of the original sample due to the labor-intensive nature 
of this process, so our results are less precisely estimated.  However, our results from this approach, 
shown in (3), are similar, which gives us confidence that our job title mapping methods do not appear to 
be introducing any idiosyncratic errors into our estimates. 
We also test the effects of moving the line at which we divide work into tradable categories.  The 
main regressions presented above divide occupations at 92 on Blinder’s scale, which is based upon our 
observation that this is the margin upon which most IT job substitution is occurring.  However, by 
moving this line further to the left, we can broaden the category of jobs consisting of tradable tasks and 
test how our results respond to moving this cutoff.  Our baseline results are reproduced in Column (4) of 
Table 12.  In Columns (5) and (6), we show results when broadening the jobs composed of tradable tasks, 
first by moving the index value threshold to 85, and then to 75, which is the value that Blinder uses to 
delineate “Category I” jobs, which are those that he deems to be highly offshorable in the long run. The 
estimates from these regressions are similar to those in Column (1), and appear to be growing slightly 
larger as we broaden the category of jobs.  Most of the effect size in this time sample, however, appears to 
be coming from jobs with an index value higher than 92. 
Finally, in Table 13, we test the validity of our interpretation of the offshoring variable, as well as 
the effects of measurement error in the offshoring variable.  Some evidence comes from our differences 
regressions above, which remove the effects of cross-firm differences.  However, there are additional 
contrasts we can use in the data. Industry reports have shown that the rise of third party offshore 
outsourcing has been exponential, and economically significant levels of offshore outsourcing are 
relatively recent.  IT services offshoring began with initial waves of multinational captive centers in the 
mid 1990’s, but third party offshore outsourcing gained in popularity only leading up to the Y2K bug in 
the late 1990’s.  As a result, the total value of all offshore outsourcing contracts to India grew from only 
$105 million in 1990, to $5.3 billion in 2000, and then to $12.2 billion in 2004 (Dossani 2004).  The 
timing of serious offshore outsourcing spending, therefore, lags the establishment of initial waves of 
multinational centers, suggesting that any omitted effects of an outsourcing variable should be small in 
the mid 1990’s. In (1), we show that results are similar when limiting the sample to the mid 1990’s, which 
predates the rise of most offshore outsourcing (t=3.33). 
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In (2), we limit our sample to the firms in our survey that reported that less than 5% of their 
budget was spent on IT outsourcing—any outsourcing levels in these firms, therefore, would have been 
minor.  The expected effects of this restriction on the offshoring estimate, however, are ambiguous, 
because it removes not only the downward bias caused by firms that engage only in offshore outsourcing, 
but also lowers the overall offshore footprint of the firms in our sample that use both captive centers and 
offshore outsourcing.  The results from this test are somewhat smaller but significant (t=1.9).  
Finally, in (3) and (4), we show the results from two different industry sub-samples, high-tech 
industries and financial industries.  This contrast is an interesting one because a recent industry report 
indicates that while Indian captive centers are popular in both industries, offshore outsourcing as the sole 
method of Indian offshoring is more common in the financial sector (Rajeevan et al 2007).  In the high-
tech sector, 10% of their sample chose offshore outsourcing as the sole method of offshoring, whereas the 
comparable figure for financial services was about 30%.  If omitting firms that use offshore outsourcing 
as the sole method of offshoring exerts a downward bias on the estimates, the coefficient estimates in the 
high-tech sector should be higher than in financial sectors, and this is consistent with what we find in (3) 
and (4), although we cannot rule out the hypothesis that these differences are caused by cross-industry 
differences.   Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 13 suggest that omitting firms that only use offshore 
outsourcing from our sample will affect our estimates in predictable and relatively minor ways. 
7. Discussion 
We use new microeconomic data to test how IT offshoring affects IT occupation composition in 
the US.  The level of data aggregation used in prior studies, along with the complexity of labor flows in 
multinational organizations, has made it difficult to directly relate offshore activity to employment shifts.  
Our results, using fine-grained IT offshoring and IT workforce data, provide support for the argument that 
offshoring shifts labor composition toward tasks that are not easily tradable across computer networks. 
Our estimates indicate that although the percentage of domestic IT workers in “offshorable” occupations 
has risen about 3 points in non-offshoring firms over the last decade, it has dropped by about 8 points in 
offshoring firms in the same time period. We also find implications for IT workers paid on an hourly 
basis, who, in our sample, were more likely to perform tradable IT tasks.  Accordingly, our estimates 
indicate that in offshoring firms, hourly workers comprise about 2-3% less of the total IT workforce than 
in other firms, which is about one-sixth of the total hourly workforce in those firms. 
We primarily contribute to a literature on IT workers and IT skills.  In particular, we look at how 
IT offshoring, an important form of globalization, affects the skill distribution within the US-based IT 
workforce, which contributes to a literature that has primarily focused on how human capital and 
institutional factors affect IT worker demand. Earlier studies have found that interpersonal skills will play 
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an increasingly important role for IT workers.  Our study indicates that offshoring will further accelerate 
this shift in the US-based IT workforce towards interpersonal skills. 
Our results, however, also have important implications for managers.  They indicate that IT jobs 
that remain in the US will have a greater component of tacit work and may also require more hands-on or 
interactive work.  This has implications for IT retention, which has historically been an important issue 
faced by IT managers (Agarwal and Ferratt 2001).  The workforce reorganization implied by our findings 
suggests that IT managers may be able to divert some of their domestic personnel resources from hiring 
and retention to job redesign and internal development.  These findings also describe how managers are 
distributing human resources in the new global economy. 
Our findings also have policy implications.  Any proposed policy interventions intended to 
address the labor market effects of IT offshoring, such as worker retraining, could productively be 
focused on workers with specific skill sets.  These results are also a useful lens through which to examine 
IT educational policies.  Our findings suggest that US-based IT workers in jobs requiring complex 
communication (e.g., persuasion, negotiation, teamwork) are less likely to be adversely affected by 
globalization trends than other workers, and therefore are consistent with recommendations from 
education scholars who advocate shifting some emphasis in the US educational system to “softer” skills 
such as creativity and complex communication, both for the workforce at large (Levy and Murnane 1996) 
and more specifically for the IT workforce.  They also suggest that US-based IT workers may find it 
productive to add business and communication skills to an existing technical portfolio, as many have 
already begun to do (Lohr 2009).   
 Finally, there are some notable limitations to this research.  Our offshoring measures omit third-
party offshore outsourcing, which suggests a potential avenue for future research.  However, this may be 
more of a limitation towards the end of our panel, when offshore outsourcing was becoming increasingly 
common. The basic assertion, that jobs are easier to offshore if the job output can easily be delivered over 
computer networks, should be true regardless of organizational form, and the available data suggest that 
offshore captive centers and third-party offshoring are positively correlated, so to some extent our 
estimates are probably capturing the combined effect of these sourcing practices in firms that have 
enough scale to establish offshore centers.  We have examined this possibility with the available data and 
find no evidence that this omission significantly biases our results.  
A second limitation of this work is that our results only capture changes at the “extensive” margin 
— in other words, how offshoring affects task mix as reflected by occupational distribution.  Changes at 
the “intensive” margin -- within-occupation changes in task composition — are also likely to be very 
important.  For example, the task content associated with the “Computer Programmer” job title may be 
shifting substantially as firms reallocate tasks among jobs to take advantage of offshoring.  Unfortunately, 
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our data are too limited to capture these changes, and offshoring is too new a phenomenon to detect these 
shifts in administrative task data (see Autor et al. 2003 for a similar exercise with computerization). 
Similarly, a number of job attributes beyond the ones studied here, such as task modularity, could affect 
offshoring propensity.  As more detailed task-level measures become available, and as firms continue to 
reengineer jobs to maximize the benefits of globalization, we hope researchers will continue to develop a 
more fine-grained understanding of how offshoring of various types is affecting the organization of work 
at a task level. 
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Figure 1: Broad Occupational Categories* 
 
*Reproduced from Blinder (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Change in U.S. Employment in Computer Related Jobs Between 2001 and 2006 
BLS Statistics 
Occupation Impersonal Task Input 2001 Employment 2006 Employment Percentage Change 
Data Entry Keyers 100 405,000 295,650 -27.0 
Computer Programmers 100 501,550 396,020 -21.0 
Computer Systems Analysts 92 448,270 446,460 -0.4 
Database Administrators 75 104,250 109,840 5.4 
Systems Software Eng 74 261,520 329.060 25.8 
Application Software Eng 74 361,690 472,520 30.6 
Network Administrators 50 126,060 203,710 61.6 
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Table 2: Descriptions of Key Variables Used in Study 
Key Variables Data Source Construction 
Captive Center in India (Y/N) Global IT Recorded as 1 if at least one IT worker employed in India. 
% IT Workers in India Global IT India IT workers / Total IT workers in global IT workforce. 
Tradable Task Share Domestic IT % of IT Workers employed in occupations classified as “tradable”1.  
Experience Domestic IT Average experience of IT workers in each firm (self-reported). 
Education Domestic IT Average education level of IT workers in firm (self-reported). 
Job Tenure Domestic IT Average job tenure of IT workers in firm.  
IT Employment Domestic IT Firm-level IT Employment. Construction described in (Tambe and Hitt 2011). 
% Security Clearance Domestic IT % of IT workers in each firm who report having security clearance. 
% Hourly Wage Domestic IT % of IT workers in each firm who report being hourly workers. 
Sales Compustat Annual sales. 
Employment Compustat Total firm employment. 
Industry Compustat Two digit SIC classification. 
Domestic Outsourcing  2008 Survey % of IT budget spent on outsourced services. 
Packaged Software Use 2008 Survey Use of packaged software vs. Build-your-own for core systems. 
1The classification of occupations as “tradable” varies in this study, but for most of our analyses is determined by using a set threshold in Blinder’s 
classification of occupations (Blinder, 2009). 
 
 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations for Firm-Level Variables (2006 Levels) 
 Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Offshoring mean 
Non-
Offshoring 
mean 
t-stata 
Captive Center in India (Y/N) 864 .073 .261 1 0  
Tradable Task Share 864 .47 .16 .36 .48    4.47*** 
Experience (Years) 864 12.8 9.4 15.4 12.6 1.87* 
Education 864 4.13 .498 4.38 4.12     3.20*** 
Job Tenure (Years) 864 2.90 1.16 2.84 2.90 0.331 
Sales (x 1,000,000) 864 10026.2 25071.6 20270.6 9528.9 2.66*** 
Employment (x 1,000) 864 31.0 86.3 49.6 30.1 1.40 
IT Employment 864 676.5 1898.6 3183.4 554.8 8.93 
% With Security Clearance 864 .077 .112 .061 .078 .961 
% Hourly Wage 864 .186 .117 .151 .188 1.93* 
Correlations are for 2006 values of shown variables. *** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10. 
at-stat tests the hypothesis that the means in offshoring and non-offshoring firms are equivalent. 
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Table 4: Correlations for Variables Used in Firm-Level Analyses 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Captive Center in India (Y/N) 1.0         
2. Tradable Task Share -.14 1.0        
3. Log(Experience) .04 -.03 1.0       
4. Log(Education) .10 -.25 -.06 1.0      
5. Log(Tenure) .01 -.04 .26 .10 1.0     
6. Log(Employment) .09 .12 .09 .02 .15 1.0    
7. Log(IT Employment) .22 .03 .11 .09 .12 .89 1.0   
8. Log(Foreign Income) .18 -.09 .05 .15 .08 .38 .43 1.0  
9. % Hourly Wage -.06 .29 -.08 -.20 -.32 .15 .09 .04 1.0 
10. % Security Clearance -.04 -.02 .06 .01 .00 .05 .10 .02 -.08 
N=810.  Correlations are for 2006 values of shown variables. 
 
 
Figure 2: Tradable Task Share in the Domestic IT Workforce, 1995-2006 
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Table 5: Captive Centers and Tradable Task Share in the Domestic IT Workforce 
 
Tradable Task Share 1995 2006 Difference 
In firms with Captive Centers in India .44 .36 -.08 
Other Firms .45 .48 .03 
Difference   -.11 
A t-test of the hypothesis that the difference between the mean differences is zero is 
rejected at the 1% level (t = 7.61) 
 
 
Table 6: Main Regression Tests of Offshoring on Domestic IT Tradable Task Intensity 
DV: Tradable Task Share (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All All All All 
 OLS Diffs IV Treatment Effects 
Captive Center in India (Y/N) -.079*** -.013** -.129** -.148*** 
     (.015)  (.006)   (.064) (.032) 
Log(Employment) .030*** -.012 .029*** .030*** 
   (.008) (.008)   (.008) (.003) 
Log(IT Employ) -.013 .011 -.011 -.013*** 
 (.008)  (.007) (.008) (.003) 
Sales Growth -.048*** .014 -.048*** -.048 
    (.008) (.010)    (.007) (.039) 
Log(Education) -.200*** -.109*** -.196*** -.199*** 
     (.029)     (.019)   (.029) (.013) 
Log(Experience) -.050** -.023** -.049** -.050*** 
  (.020) (.009) (.020) (.008) 
Log(Job Tenure) -.010 -.046*** -.010 -.010* 
     (.012)     (.011)  (.012) (.006) 
First Stage R2   .19 .10 
Controls Industry Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Observations 8789 7190 8789 8789 
R-squared 0.21 0.03 0.20  
*** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10.  Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. All regressions include controls for 
year and 2-digit SIC industry. A Sargan test for overidentification is not rejected. A Hausman test cannot reject 
the hypothesis that OLS (Col 1) is consistent. 
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Table 7: Regression Tests of Percentage of Offshore IT Workers on Domestic IT Tradable Task Intensity 
DV: Tradable Task 
Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All All Offshoring Only 
Offshoring 
Only All All 
 OLS Differences OLS Differences IV OLS 
% IT Workers in India -.224*** -.080** .248* -.095* -1.51 .109 
 (.086) (.034) (.147) (.050) (1.04) (.105) 
Captive Center in 
India (Y/N)      -.091*** 
      (.019) 
Log(Employment) .031*** -.012 .039 -.076** .030*** .030*** 
 (.008) (.008) (.028) (.030) (.008) (.008) 
Log(IT Employ) -.016** .011 -.003 .063** -.013 -.013 
 (.008) (.007) (.028) (.028) (.009) (.008) 
Sales Growth -.048*** .014 2.92 .013 -.046*** -.049*** 
 (.007) (.010) (4.16) (.011) (.007) (.008) 
Log(Education) -.204*** -.109*** -.317** -.501*** -.195*** -.199*** 
   (.029)    (.020) (.146) (.131) (.030) (.029) 
Log(Experience) -.052*** -.023** -.057** -.007 -.059** -.049** 
 (.020) (.009) (.027) (.006) (.022) (.020) 
Log(Job Tenure) -.010 -.045*** .057 -.026 -.007 -.010 
 (.012) (.010) (.047) (.048) (.013) (.012) 
Controls Industry Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
N 8789 7190 328 299 8789 8789 
R2 0.21 .03 .39 .24 .14 .21 
*** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10.  Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. All regressions include controls for year and 2 digit SIC 
industry. 
 
Table 8: Regressions of Offshoring on the Use of IT Hourly Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent 
Variable 
% Hourly 
Workers 
% Hourly 
Workers 
Tradable 
Task Share 
Tradable 
Task Share 
Tradable 
Task Share 
Tradable 
Task Share 
% Hourly 
Workers 
Sample All All Full-Time Hourly All All Exempt Workers 
 OLS Differences OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Captive Center in 
India (Y/N) -.027* -.007 -.084** -.096** -.074** -.065** -.031* 
   (.015)  (.004)    (.027)    (.047) (.025) (.025) (.017) 
% Hourly      .333***  
      (.062)  
 Industry Industry Year Industry Industry Industry Industry Industry 
N 863 5685 773 270 863 863 452 
R2 .27 .04 .24 .33 .21 .25 .31 
Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01.  Exempt workers in (7) are IT managers, systems analysts, and 
software engineers. All regressions include controls for year and 2-digit SIC industry. 
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Table 9: OLS Regressions by Offshore Worker Location and Type 
DV: Tradable Task Share    
By Location  By IT Worker Type  
India -.487** Technical -.485** 
    (.233)  (.232) 
All Other -.008 Managerial -.153 
 (.015)  (.242) 
  All Other -.330 
   (.288) 
N 5616  1625 
R2 0.26  0.19 
Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. *p<.10, **p<.05. Regressions are from baseline model used in Table 13, 
Column 1. All regressions include controls for year and 2 digit SIC industry. 
 
Table 10: Robustness Tests 
DV: Tradable 
Task Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
All All All SIC 73 Other Industries 
Outsourcing  
& Packaged 
Software 
Closures 
 External 
IV Set 
Full 
IV Set 
Differences 
IV IV IV OLS Diffs 
Captive Center in 
India (Y/N) -.065* -.097** -.017 -.081 -.202*** -.082* -.026** 
 (.035) (.038) (.061)   (.090) (.083) (.046) (.010) 
% Outsourced      .003  
      (.008)  
Packaged 
Software 
     .015  
      (.013)  
First Stage R2 .16 .19 .02 .16 .14   
Controls Industry Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Observations 8176 8176 6600 2090 6256 559 7137 
R-squared .20 .20 .02 .07 .04 .53 .03 
*** p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10.  Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. All regressions include controls for year and 2 digit SIC 
industry. 
 
Table 11: Comparison of Workforce Composition with Domestic Outsourcing Industries 
 N Tradable Task Intensity 
Computer Programming and Consulting (7370) 8848 .43 
All Other Industries 353 .45 
  t = 0.14, p<.89a 
Firms With High Security Work (SIC 73) 94 .47 
Other Firms (SIC 73) 86 .38 
  t = 3.62, p<.01b 
at-test of the hypothesis that tradable task intensity is the same in SIC 7370 as in all other industries. 
bt-test of the hypothesis that tradable task intensity in high-security firms in SIC 73 is the same as in other firms in SIC 
73. 
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Table 12: Sensitivity to Model Assumptions and IT Workforce Measurement 
DV: Tradable Task 
Share (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Cost Share Offshoring x Year 
Manual 
Coding 
Index 
Threshold 
>= 92 
Index 
Threshold 
>= 85 
Index 
Threshold >= 
75 
Captive Center  in 
India (Y/N) -.086** -.100** -.050** -.079** -.083** -.090** 
 (.026) (.019) (.014)    (.015)    (.015)    (.015) 
Controls Industry Year 
Industry 
Off x Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Industry 
Year 
Observations 579 8789 5202 8789 8789 8789 
R-squared .18 .21 .19 .22 .19 .22 
Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. *p<.10, **p<.05.  Other independent variables include employment, IT employment, 
sales growth, education, experience, and job tenure.  In (2), the hypothesis that the offshoring x year dummy variables are different 
than zero is not jointly significant: F(10, 1430)=.95; Prob > F=.48. All regressions include controls for year and 2-digit SIC industry. 
 
 
Table 13: Sensitivity to Measurement of the Offshoring Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV: % Tradable Tasks Prior to 1998 
Outsourcing 
< 5% High Tech 
Financial 
Services 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Captive Center in India (Y/N) -.080*** -.063* -.086*** -.060*** 
 (.024) (.033) (.022) (.026) 
N 1583 162 2090 1318 
R2 .20 .73 .15 .13 
Standard errors are robust, clustered on firm. *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. All regressions include controls 
for year and 2-digit SIC industry. 
 
 
 
 
